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The neural signature of social norm compliance
Abstract
All known human societies establish social order by punishing violators of social norms. However, little
is known about how the human brain processes the punishment threat associated with norm violations.
We use fMRI to study the neural circuitry behind forced norm compliance by comparing a treatment in
which norm violations can be punished with a control treatment in which punishment is impossible.
Individuals' increase in norm compliance when punishment is possible exhibits a strong positive
correlation with activations in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
These activations are also modulated by the social nature of the task. Moreover, activation in lateral
orbitofrontal cortex shows a strong positive correlation with Machiavellian personality characteristics.
These findings indicate a neural network involved in forced norm compliance that may constitute an
important basis for human sociality. Different activations of this network reveal individual differences in
the behavioral response to the punishment threat and may thus provide a deeper understanding of the
neurobiological sources of pathologies such as antisocial personality disorder.
Neuron
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All known human societies establish social
order by punishing violators of social norms.
However, little is known about how the brain
processes the punishment threat associated
with norm violations. We use fMRI to study the
neural circuitry behind social norm compliance
by comparing a treatment in which norm viola-
tions can be punished with a control treatment
in which punishment is impossible. Individuals’
increase in norm compliance when punishment
is possible exhibits a strong positive correla-
tion with activations in the lateral orbitofrontal
cortex and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
Moreover, lateral orbitofrontal cortex activity
is strongly correlated with Machiavellian per-
sonality characteristics. These findings indicate
a neural network involved in social norm com-
pliance that might constitute an important ba-
sis for human sociality. Different activations of
this network reveal individual differences in the
behavioral response to the punishment threat
and might thus provide a deeper understanding
of the neurobiological sources of pathologies
such as antisocial personality disorder.
INTRODUCTION
Humans are unique among all species in the extent to
which they regulate social life through compliance with
social norms. Such norms constitute standards of behav-
ior that are based on widely shared beliefs on how indi-
viduals ought to behave in a given situation (Elster, 1989).
Ethnographic evidence (Sober and Wilson, 1998), evolu-
tionary theory (Boyd et al., 2003), and laboratory studies
(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002) indicate that the maintenance
of social norms typically requires a punishment threat,
as there are almost always some individuals whose self-
interest tempts them to violate the norm. Norm obedience
sometimes vanishes quickly in the absence of a credible
punishment threat. Following the death of Valentinian III
in 455 A.D., vandals invaded and looted Rome. PoliceNstrikes in Liverpool in 1919 and in Montreal in 1956 caused
huge increases in crime rates (Adenaes, 1974), and during
the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2001—
when the police were occupied with responding to the
disaster—many ATMs were robbed. The dissolution of
obedience to prevailing norms occurs because people
often comply with social norms conditional on others’
compliance (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Thus, even a minor-
ity of noncompliers can trigger a process that induces
widespread defection from prevailing norms.
Legal institutions such as the police and the courts en-
force many norms in most contemporary human societies.
However, legal enforcement mechanisms cannot function
unless they are based on a broad consensus about the
normative legitimacy of rules, that is, unless social norms
support legal rules. The very existence of legal enforce-
ment institutions is itself a product of prior norms about
what constitutes appropriate behavior. Private sanctions
have enforced social norms for millennia, long before le-
gal enforcement institutions existed, and punishment
by peers still represents a powerful norm enforcement
device, even in contemporary Western societies (Fehr
and Ga¨chter, 2002). In view of the prominent role of
such peer punishment in human evolution (Sober and
Wilson, 1998; Boyd et al., 2003), we conjecture that hu-
mans have developed elaborate neural mechanisms for
social cognition that produce appropriate responses to
the threat of peer punishment. However, although impor-
tant work examining the neural bases of economic choice
(Glimcher et al., 2005; Hsu et al., 2005), social cognition
(Adolphs, 2001, 2003), moral judgment (Greene et al.,
2001, 2004; Moll et al., 2002, 2005; Raine and Yang,
2006), social cooperation (Rilling et al., 2002; Singer
et al., 2006; Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2005),
and social punishment (Sanfey et al., 2003; de Quervain
et al., 2004; Knoch et al., 2006) exists, the brain systems
involved in forced norm compliance still remain unknown.
In particular, the previous literature on social punishment
examines the neural circuitry involved in the decision to
punish whereas our work focuses on the neural circuitry
involved in the processing and the response to punish-
ment threats that are associated with norm violations.
In the present study, we combined a behavioral exper-
iment, involving real monetary stakes and the requirement
to curb immediate self-interest in order to obey a fairness
norm, with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)euron 56, 185–196, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 185
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Social Norm ComplianceFigure 1. Timeline of Screens within a Single Trial of the fMRI Experiment
The first screen (‘‘rest’’) shows a fixation symbol that indicates the beginning of a new trial; it was displayed for a duration of 6 s plus a jitter in the range
of one scanner repetition time (TR), drawn from a uniform distribution (‘‘z6s’’). The symbols 0:0 and 5:1 on the second screen (‘‘treatment’’) indicate
the control and punishment condition, respectively. The first number in a symbol represents the reduction of player A’s income per punishment point;
the second number, the reduction of B’s. The third screen (‘‘decide’’) informed player A that he could make his decision with no time restrictions. Thus,
as there is quite some variation in decision times across trials and across players, this feature of our design introduces an additional jitter mechanism.
In the punishment condition, the fourth screen (‘‘wait’’) indicates that player B is making his decision. In the control condition, player A also faced the
‘‘wait’’ screen for the same length of time before profits and losses of both players were displayed in the fifth, ‘‘informed’’ screen.to study how the threat of punishment enforced norm
compliance in subjects who have to decide whether to
obey or violate the fairness norm (Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2002). If subjects violate the norm in the control condition,
they face no sanctions whatsoever. In the punishment
condition, however, the victim of the norm violation could
punish the perpetrator. As violations of fairness norms
motivate the victim to punish the violator (Fehr and Fisch-
bacher, 2004; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Gu¨th et al., 1982),
potential norm violators faced a serious punishment threat
in the punishment condition.
Two players, A (in the scanner) and B, interacted anon-
ymously with each other (see also Experimental Proce-
dures). Each knew that he was facing a human player.
Player A received an endowment of 100 money units
(MUs), which he could distribute freely between himself
and player B. In the control condition, which resembles
a dictator game, B was a passive recipient (Kahneman
et al., 1986) of A’s monetary transfer. In contrast, B could186 Neuron 56, 185–196, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Incpunish A in the punishment condition after having been
informed of the latter’s decision (Andreoni et al., 2003).
Each player received an additional endowment of 25 MUs
in both conditions, for reasons of fairness and to make
punishment possible. In the punishment condition, B
could spend all or part of this amount to reduce A’s earn-
ings; every MU B invested into punishment led to a reduc-
tion of A’s earnings by 5 MUs. For example, if A kept all the
100 MUs for himself and B punished maximally, then A’s
earnings (100 MUs initial endowment plus 25 MUs ad-
ditional endowment) were reduced by 125 MUs. Thus,
the punishment condition resembles an ultimatum game
(Gu¨th et al., 1982), with the exception that player B has
a larger set of available punishment actions.
Player A participated in a sequence of 24 trials in total,
facing a different player B in every trial. Control and
punishment conditions were randomized across trials. In
every trial, there was an initial rest phase of about 6 s (Fig-
ure 1). Then player A was informed about whether he was.
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Social Norm Compliancein the punishment or the control condition. Player A could
then submit his decision (‘‘decide’’ in Figure 1). After the
decision player A had to wait until being informed about
player B’s punishment decision and the associated final
payoffs of the players.
In the control condition, a purely self-interested player A
should retain the entire endowment for himself. Behavioral
studies (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Kahneman et al.,
1986) indicate, however, that the equal split is the most sa-
lient fairness norm in situations such as the described
control and punishment conditions, as there is simply no
reason why A deserves more than B. Evidence for this fair-
ness norm comes, for example, from so-called third party
punishment experiments in which a third player (whom we
label player C) is informed about how much A gives to B
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Then the third player has
the opportunity to punish player A. Typically, player C
punishes selfish deviations from the equal split and the
punishment is the stronger the more player A deviates in
the selfish direction from the equal split. Moreover, Fehr
and Fischbacher (2004) elicited fairness judgments which
clearly indicate that the egalitarian solution is perceived to
be the fair solution and that deviations from the equal split
are considered unfair. Thus, fairness judgments, and the
observed punishment patterns of third parties, indicate
that there is a clear fairness norm in situations where
player A can share an endowment with player B. However,
in anonymous interactions without a punishment opportu-
nity, such as the above control condition, only a minority of
the players typically obey the fairness norm completely. A
significant proportion of the subjects do not share at all,
and another substantial proportion give a positive amount
that is less than the equal split to player B (Camerer, 2003).
In the punishment condition, however, player A is likely to
face a strong incentive for approaching the equal split
because he will be punished severely otherwise. One of
the key questions, therefore, was how many more MUs
player A transfers to B in the punishment condition, and
which brain circuits are associated with this behavioral
change.
The control condition measures how much of the 100
MUs player A is willing to give voluntarily to player B.
This amount can be interpreted as a reflection of A’s pref-
erence for giving, i.e., as a reflection of his immediate self-
interest. As a consequence, if A gives amount X to player
B in the control condition, then A is apparently not willing
to give more than X; i.e., giving more than X is not in
A’s immediate self-interest. Therefore, if the punishment
threat in the punishment condition induces A to give
more than X, the punishment threat requires the inhibition
of player A’s immediate self-interest in order to prevent
being punished by B. We therefore conjectured that dur-
ing the decision phase (Figure 1), lateral prefrontal areas
such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), or
the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), which have
been shown to be reliably involved in cognitive control
and the inhibition of prepotent responses (Aron et al.,
2004; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Sanfey et al., 2003), willbe more strongly activated in the punishment condition.
This conjecture is also suggested by a recent study
(Knoch et al., 2006) where subjects could take a fair
action that yields a lower economic payoff than the self-
interested one. If the experimenter disrupted subjects’
right DLPFC with low-frequency transcranial magnetic
stimulation, the selfish action was chosen much more
frequently, and much faster, despite the fact that their fair-
ness judgments remained unaffected. Thus, subjects with
right DLPFC disruption behaved as if they could no longer
resist the temptation to choose the selfish action, indi-
cating that when self-interest and fairness are in conflict,
the selfish action is the prepotent response. In view of
the important role of DLPFC in overriding prepotent
impulses (Aron et al., 2004; Miller and Cohen, 2001), this
brain area might also play a role in our experiment be-
cause subjects’ prepotent response (i.e., their immediate
self-interest) is to violate the fairness norm.
In the punishment condition player A also has to evalu-
ate the sanctioning threat. Several studies suggest lateral
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) involvement in the evaluation of
punishing stimuli that may lead to behavioral changes
(Kringelbach, 2005; O’Doherty et al., 2001). These findings
led to the conjecture that the OFC might be more strongly
activated in the punishment condition.
One of the key features of the present paradigm is that
the threat of punishment might induce some subjects to
share more equally than when the punishment threat is
absent. In order to test whether subjects with a higher
propensity to respond to the punishment threat have
different personality characteristics, we measured sub-
jects’ Machiavellism—a combination of selfishness and
opportunism—with the Machiavelli questionnaire (Christie
and Geis, 1970). In this questionnaire the subjects indicate
their degree of agreement with statements such as ‘‘It’s
hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there’’
and ‘‘The best way to deal with people is to tell them what
they want to hear.’’ It seems plausible to conjecture that
subjects with a high Machiavelli score behave more self-
ishly in the control condition than subjects with a low
Machiavelli score. Subjects with higher scores might also
increase their transfers substantially in the punishment
condition because their opportunism could induce them
to strongly adjust their behavior when they face the threat
of punishment. In order to explore a possible relation-
ship between Machiavellian personality characteristics
and the brain circuits activated by the threat of punish-
ment, we also computed correlations between individ-
uals’ Machiavelli score and their brain activations during
decisions under threat of punishment minus control.
Finally, an important question in the context of our
experimental design is whether the activations we will
observe in the punishment condition are specific to the
enforcement of social norms or whether they reflect a
more general brain response to any kind of social or non-
social punishment threat. In principle, the evaluation of
punishing stimuli or the inhibition of prepotent responses
could also play a role if player A is not involved in a socialNeuron 56, 185–196, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 187
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Social Norm Complianceinteraction with B but merely faces a punishment threat
that a preprogrammed computer executes.
In order to examine whether the brain responds differ-
ently to social and nonsocial punishment threats, we
conducted an additional experiment with a nonsocial
punishment condition, where we kept everything constant
relative to the previously described social punishment
condition except for the fact that player A did not face a
human player B but only a preprogrammed computer. In
particular, the computer’s punishment ‘‘choices’’ in the
nonsocial punishment condition were distributed in the
same way as the punishment choices of human player B
in the social condition. Thus, player A faced exactly the
same probability and size of punishment for any given
transfer level in the nonsocial condition as in the social
punishment condition, except that a preprogrammed
computer—and not a human player—executed the
punishment.
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
Transfer Difference
In the control condition, 11 subjects transferred on average
less than 5 MUs, another 11 subjects transferred between
10 and 20 MUs on average, and only 1 subject transferred
more than 30 MUs. This contrasts sharply with the social
punishment condition, where 16 subjects gave about
50 MUs and only 7 subjects gave less than 40 MUs on av-
erage. None of the subjects transferred 0 MUs in the social
punishment condition. On average, A gave about 10 MUs
to B during the control condition, while A transferred about
40 MUs (Figure 2) in the social punishment condition. The
transfer difference between conditions is highly significant
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 23, p < 0.001).
Machiavellism and Transfer Difference
We found a negative correlation (r = 0.47, p = 0.026)
between subjects’ Machiavelli scores and their average
transfers in the control condition, and a positive correla-
tion (r = 0.50, p = 0.017) with their behavioral changes
(measured in terms of transfer differences between the
punishment and the control condition) caused by the
social punishment threat. Therefore, Machiavellian sub-
jects earned the highest incomes because they earned
most in the control condition and were best at escaping
punishment in the social punishment condition. The corre-
lation between overall earnings and the Machiavelli score
was 0.48 (p = 0.026). In the social punishment condition,
for example, subjects in the highest quartile of the Machia-
velli score earned 41% more than subjects in the lowest
quartile.
fMRI Data
Since we are interested in the neural circuitry associated
with norm compliance behavior, all fMRI data presented
below relate to the decision-making epoch of the experi-
ment. As predicted, the contrast (averaged across all
subjects) between brain activations during decisions188 Neuron 56, 185–196, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Incunder the social punishment threat and activations during
decisions in the control condition was significant (see Fig-
ure 3, Table 1) in the DLPFC (Brodmann Areas [BA] 9 and
BA 46), the VLPFC (BA 10/46), and the anterior orbitolat-
eral prefrontal cortices (OLPFC; BA 47). All activation
increases in the PFC occurred bilaterally (Figure 3; see
also Figure S1 in the Supplemental Data, available with
this article online, for time courses). In addition, we found
a significant activation in bilateral medial caudate nucleus
(Figure 3D).
If we compare the social with the nonsocial punishment
condition, we observe that, among the areas reported in
Figure 3, activation in the right DLPFC (BA 46 [28 26
24]), the left VLPFC (BA 10 [42 52 2]), and the right
OLPFC (BA 47 [44 42 6]) was higher in the social con-
dition (at p < 0.005; Table S1 in the online Supplemen-
tal Data). Beyond these predefined regions, significantly
higher activation in the social context additionally
occurred in the right insula, the left OLPFC, and the left
superior temporal gyrus (Table S3). In the reverse contrast
(nonsocial punishment > social punishment), we do not
find any differences in a whole-brain analysis even if we
lower the significance level to p < 0.01.
Combination of Behavioral and fMRI Data
Transfer Difference
When correlating the increase in brain activations during
social punishment trials (punishment minus control) with
the increase in MUs transferred to player B in these trials
relative to the control condition (transfer difference), we
observed strong positive correlations at locations summa-
rized in Table 2. Figure 4 shows scatter plots of the stron-
gest correlations in the right caudate nucleus (r = 0.70, p <
0.001) and the right DLPFC (r = 0.69, p < 0.001).
Machiavellism
When correlating individuals’ differential brain activations
in social punishment minus control with individual
Figure 2. Player A’s Average Transfer to Player B over 12
Trials for Both the Control and Punishment Conditions
Player A’s transfer is much closer to the fairness norm of 50% in the
punishment condition, indicating the effectiveness of the punishment
threat..
Neuron
Social Norm ComplianceFigure 3. Significantly Different Activa-
tions in the Punishment Condition Rela-
tive to the Control Condition Where No
Punishment of Player A Was Possible
Images are sliced at peak of activation given in
Table 1. Transversal and coronal slices are
indicated by z and y coordinates, respectively.
(A) Bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC, Brodmann Areas [BA] 46 and 9; sliced
at [32, 26, 28]; x, y, z coordinates in MNI
space).
(B) Bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(VLPFC, BA 10/46; [46, 48, 4]).
(C) Bilateral orbitolateral prefrontal cortex
(OLPFC, BA 47; [44, 42, 6]).
(D) Bilateral caudate nucleus [16, 10, 14].Machiavelli scores, we observed strong positive correla-
tions in the left anterior OFC (BA 11/47; peak voxel
at [32, 44, 8]; r = 0.71; p < 0.001). This cluster also
contains voxels with a positive correlation between indi-
viduals’ differential brain activation and the increase in
norm compliance in the social punishment condition,
i.e., the transfer difference across conditions (Figure 5).
Additionally, Machiavelli scores were strongly correlated
with brain activation in social punishment minus control
in the right insula (peak voxel at [42, 8, 0]; r = 0.64; p <
0.001; Figure 6).
Even at a threshold of p < 0.05 at the voxel level (extent
threshold of 102 voxels corresponding to a level of p = 0.5
at the cluster level), we did not find correlations between
Machiavelli scores and brain activity in the other main
areas of activation, i.e., in bilateral DLPFC, VLPFC, and
caudate nuclei (Figure 3). Hence, among the main areas
of brain activation (depicted in Figure 3), the correlation
between individuals’ Machiavelli scores and brain activity
appears to be specific to the lateral OFC.
DISCUSSION
In order to investigate the neural correlates of norm com-
pliance, we set up an experimental paradigm with twomain conditions: a control condition, where player A could
freely distribute the initial endowment of 100 MUs be-
tween himself and player B, and a social punishment
condition, where A knew that B could punish him after
being informed of his sharing decision.
Behavioral results indicate that the social punishment
threat was very effective in inducing subjects to obey the
fairness norm. In fact, several of the A subjects who
gave 0 MUs in the control condition changed their behav-
ior markedly in the social punishment condition, making
average transfers close to the equal split. This strong
behavioral change across conditions was triggered by
the severe punishment that subjects in the role of player
B imposed on norm violators—the more player A fell short
of the fair transfer level of 50 MUs, the more player B
punished him.
Because the social punishment condition forces sub-
jects to move closer to the fairness norm, we conjectured
that forced norm compliance might activate prefrontal
brain regions implicated in the evaluation of punishing
stimuli (Kringelbach, 2005; O’Doherty et al., 2001) and
the inhibition of prepotent responses (Aron et al., 2004;
Miller and Cohen, 2001; Sanfey et al., 2003). The fMRI
data are consistent with these conjectures (Figure 3). In
addition, activations in the DLPFC and OLPFC wereNeuron 56, 185–196, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 189
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that the social punishment threat induces. Subjects with
stronger differential activations of the DLPFC exhibited
larger transfer increases across conditions. Likewise, sub-
Table 1. Significant Differences in Brain Activation in
the Contrast Punishment Minus Control of the Social
Experiment
Anatomical Region L/R BA x y z Z-Score
DLPFC L 9 32 26 28 3.69
L 46 42 44 20 3.43
R 46 28 26 24 3.95
R 9 38 38 28 3.22
VLPFC L 10 42 52 2 3.62
L 10/46 34 50 6 3.5
R 10/46 46 48 6 3.16
OLPFC L 47 40 36 14 2.98
R 47 44 42 6 2.94
Caudate nucleus L 14 8 12 3.86
L 20 2 20 3.00
R 16 10 14 5.01
R 14 2 20 3.34
Thalamus L 6 4 4 3.51
Fusiform gyrus L 18/37 28 68 18 3.91
Lingual gyrus L 18 6 82 12 4.11
17/18 18 80 12 4.02
Cerebellum R 30 64 28 3.47
2 60 24 3.32
16 76 28 3.05
Notation in Table 1: L/R: left/right; BA: Brodmann Areas; x, y,
z: stereotaxic coordinates (MNI space). z-thresholds and
associated significance level: Z = 3.09, p = 0.001; Z = 2.81,
p = 0.0025. Predicted activations are in italics.190 Neuron 56, 185–196, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.jects with greater differential activation of the OLPFC
showed a stronger increase in norm compliance in the
social punishment condition. If activation in the lateral
OFC represents the punishing stimulus in our task, the
strong correlation between lateral OFC activation and
increases in norm compliance may indicate that subjects
with a stronger subjective representation of the punish-
ment threat show stronger norm compliance in response
to this threat.
In addition, we found significantly higher activation in
the bilateral medial caudate nucleus (Figure 3D), which
plays a crucial role in processing information about posi-
tive and negative reinforcers. Single-neuron recording in
nonhuman primates (Schultz, 2000) and neuroimaging
studies with humans using money as a reward (Delgado
et al., 2003; Knutson et al., 2000, 2001) reliably show
caudate activation in tasks involving uncertain rewards
or punishments. Moreover, the caudate is primarily acti-
vated upon contingency between an action and a reward
(O’Doherty et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 2003; Tricomi et al.,
2004), e.g., if a subject can increase his chances of earn-
ing additional money or decrease the probability of losing
money by taking appropriate actions. Since the monetary
reward values of different transfer levels are completely
certain in the control condition but highly uncertain in the
punishment condition, the caudate is likely to be more
strongly activated in the punishment condition. Conse-
quently, higher caudate activity in the social punishment
condition may represent the expected, yet uncertain, pun-
ishment reduction associated with transfer increases. This
interpretation is further supported by the fact that the
strength of the caudate activation predicts the increase
in norm compliance across treatment conditions because
subjects who expect a higher punishment reduction from
a given transfer increase have reason to increase their
transfers more strongly in the punishment condition.
Some researchers (Knutson et al., 2000, 2001) have also
pointed out that caudate activity in monetary incentive
delay tasks may represent the arousal associated with
perceived (but uncertain) reward and punishment levels.Table 2. Significant Correlations between Individual Transfer Differences and Individual Brain Activations in the
Contrast Punishment Minus Control of the Social Experiment
Anatomical Region L/R BA x y z Z-Score r
Caudate nucleusa R 12 4 20 3.72 0.700
L 20 10 22 3.42 0.659
DLPFC R 46 52 28 14 3.67 0.694
OLPFCa L 11 36 48 10 3.46 0.665
Inferior frontal gyrus R 45 60 22 10 3.37 0.652
Middle/Inferior temporal gyrus R 21/20 56 34 6 3.35 0.650
L 21/20 56 34 16 3.82 0.713
L/R: left/right; BA: Brodmann Areas; x, y, z: stereotaxic coordinates in mm (MNI space); Z = 3.09, p = 0.001; r: correlation coefficient.
a This region was also significantly more active in the punishment minus control contrast of the social experiment. For further
correlations between individual transfer differences and differential brain activations within brain regions significant in the main
effect analysis (punishment minus control) of the social experiment, please consult Table S2 of the Supplemental Data.
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given above because it makes the same predictions. If
caudate activation represents the arousal associated
with the punishment threat, one should also observe
more caudate activation in the punishment condition. In
addition, subjects experiencing more arousal (higher cau-
date activation) can be plausibly expected to exhibit a
stronger increase in norm compliance in the punishment
condition.
In addition, we found that Machiavellian personality
characteristics played an important role in social norm
compliance and associated brain activity. The subjects’
Machiavelli scores were strongly correlated with the
increase in norm compliance in the social punishment
condition, and with activations in brain regions associated
with the evaluation of punishing stimuli (lateral OFC; see
Figure 4. Positive Correlations between Individual Activation
Differences in the Contrast Punishment Minus Control and
Individual Transfer Differences between Punishment and
Control Conditions
Subjects with higher activation differences exhibit higher transfer
increases under the threat of punishment. (A) Right caudate nucleus.
(B) Right DLPFC. The dashed lines represent the best linear fit; r
denotes the correlation coefficient. Correlations are significant at
a level of p < 0.001 (see also Table 2). Coordinates refer to peak acti-
vations and are in mm.Figure 5) and the representation of emotional states
(insula; see Figure 6). The strong correlations in the left lat-
eral OFC may be interpreted as additional support for the
hypothesis that this brain area plays a special role in
detecting and evaluating the punishment threat. Machia-
vellian subjects are, by definition, self-interested and op-
portunistic. Therefore, for such subjects good abilities in
detecting and evaluating threats to their self-interest are
particularly useful.
The strong correlation of brain activation in the right
insula with individuals’ Machiavelli score is interesting
because a number of findings indicate the insula’s involve-
ment in emotional experiences such as anger, fear, pain,
sadness, and disgust (Craig, 2002). There is also increas-
ing evidence that the insula is a key component of individ-
uals’ interoceptive subjective awareness of their bodily
states, including states of emotional arousal (Craig,
2002; Critchley, 2005). Recent studies even suggest that
midinsular and anterior insular regions are implicated in
the integration of the interoceptive representation of threat-
related bodily arousal responses with the conscious
awareness of the threat (Critchley, 2005; Critchley et al.,
2004). In view of these results, Machiavellian subjects
might have experienced stronger negative affect during
the punishment condition, which may have contributed
to their stronger behavioral response in this condition.
An interesting question in the context of this paper is
which of the brain activations observed in Figure 3 and
Table 1 are specific to the enforcement of norms prevail-
ing in social interactions, and which activations are merely
generated by the fact that lower transfer levels trigger
a subsequent payoff reduction (punishment). In principle,
the evaluation of punishing stimuli or the inhibition of pre-
potent responses could also play a role if player A faces
a punishment threat that a preprogrammed computer
executes. It is interesting in this context that the lateral
OFC and DLPFC (in particular the right DLPFC) have often
been implicated in social moral judgment tasks (Greene
et al., 2004; Moll et al., 2003, 2005; Prehn and Heekeren,
2007). Perhaps the stronger activation of these regions
in the punishment condition could reflect recruitment in
the service of moral and social cognition.
The nonsocial punishment condition enables us to
answer the question of whether the recruitment of the
brain regions described in Figure 3 is stronger in the social
than the nonsocial condition. The fact that, among the
areas reported in Figure 3, activation in the right DLPFC
(BA 46 [28 26 24]), the left VLPFC (BA 10 [42 52 2]),
and the right OLPFC (BA 47 [44 42 6]) is higher in the
social condition (at p < 0.005, Table S1) supports the
view that the activation in these areas is at least partially
specific to the social nature of the punishment threat. In
addition, significantly higher activation in the social con-
text occurred in the right insula, in the left OLPFC (in a
different cluster from the one in Figure 3), and in the left
superior temporal gyrus (Table S3), a brain area that has
often been implicated in social cognition (Ochsner, 2004;
Lieberman, 2007). Taken together these results indicateNeuron 56, 185–196, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 191
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Social Norm ComplianceFigure 5. Anatomical Overlap of Correlations of Both Transfer Differences and Machiavelli Scores with Differential Brain Activa-
tions from the Contrast Punishment Minus Control in Left Lateral OFC
The highest correlation with transfer differences (r = 0.67; p < 0.001; Table 2) occurs at MNI location [36, 48, 10]. The highest correlation with the
Machiavelli score (r = 0.71; p < 0.001) occurs at [32, 44, 8]. (A) A sagittal and coronal zoom of this region. Voxels with significant correlations
between transfer difference and differential brain activation are color-coded in blue. Red color denotes significant correlation with the Machiavelli
score. Overlapping voxels are in violet. (B and C) Scatter plots of correlations calculated from voxel [34, 48,10] in the overlapping region; transfer
difference: z-score = 3.28; p < 0.001; Machiavelli score: z-score = 3.34, p < 0.001, with dashed lines representing the best linear fit; r denotes the
correlation coefficient. Coordinates are in mm.that the presence of a social context either activates
specific brain areas or modulates activations observed
in right DLPFC, left VLPFC, and bilateral OLPFC.
In this study, we sought to uncover the neural circuits
involved in social norm compliance. This question touches
the very foundations of human sociality because the estab-
lishment of large-scale cooperation through social norms
is a unique feature of the human species. Norm compli-
ance among humans is either based on people’s voluntary
compliance with standards of behavior that are viewed as
normatively legitimate or on the enforcement of compli-
ance through punishment. Although much compliance is
voluntary, there can be little doubt that social order would
quickly break down in the absence of punishment threats
because a minority of noncompliers can trigger a process
that leads to widespread noncompliance due to the condi-
tional nature of many people’s compliance (Fischbacher
et al., 2001; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002).
To our knowledge, this is the first study that examines
the brain processes involved in humans’ behavioral
response to the threat of punishment for social norm
violations. We developed a paradigmatic task that enables
the study of norm compliance at both the behavioral and
brain level. We therefore believe that our study might
contribute to a deeper understanding of important neuro-192 Neuron 56, 185–196, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.biological aspects of human sociality such as the neuro-
biological basis of individual differences in social norm
compliance in healthy subjects, which—in view of the
strong role of Machiavellian personality traits in our task—
includes exciting potential insights into the role of the
‘‘Machiavellian Mind’’ in norm compliance. One possible
interpretation of the fact that Machiavellian subjects
earn more money in the social experiment is that they
have better reward-learning abilities with associated
modulation of structures including the OFC and the basal
ganglia. Although better reward-learning skills may repre-
sent a basic neurobiological feature of Machiavellian
personalities, it is unlikely that such a multifaceted trait
can be reduced to one single dimension. If Machiavellism
were reducible to reward-learning ability, one would ex-
pect a correlation between Machiavelli score and striatal
activations, but we fail to observe a correlation between
Machiavelli scores and caudate activity. Instead, we find
a strong positive correlation between Machiavelli scores
and activation in left OLPFC and the right insula; parts of
these brain regions are also more strongly recruited in
the social punishment condition than in the nonsocial
condition. Therefore, Machiavellian personality traits may
also rely on abilities and brain regions that are more spe-
cifically tied to the social nature of human interactions.
Neuron
Social Norm ComplianceFigure 6. Correlation of Machiavelli Scores with Differential Brain Activations from the Contrast Social Punishment Minus Control
in the Right Insula
(A) Location in MNI space, sliced at [42 8 4; r = 0.58; p = 0.0017]. The inset is a sagittal view of the correlation map to show its extension from midinsular
to anterior insular cortex, where correlations are also significant [42 14 2; r = 0.54, p = 0.0037].
(B) Correlation plot of the highest coefficient at [42 8 0; r = 0.64; p < 0.001]. Dashed lines represent the best linear fit; r denotes the correlation
coefficient. Coordinates are in mm.The approach taken in this paper might also illuminate
potential defects in the neural circuitry associated with
severely diminished social norm compliance in people
with antisocial personality disorder (Raine and Yang,
2006). Work by Veit et al. (2002) and Birbaumer et al.
(2005) has, for example, shown that healthy control sub-
jects show significant activation in the lateral OFC and
the insula in a fear conditioning paradigm in which physi-
cal pain is associated with the conditioned stimulus. In
sharp contrast, criminal psychopaths exhibit no such
activations in this task. The authors interpret these find-
ings as support for a lack of emotional anticipation of
aversive events in criminal psychopaths. The fact that
criminal psychopaths show a lack of activation during
the acquisition of fear in lateral OFC, wherein we observe
correlations with both subjects’ Machiavelli scores and
their increases in norm compliance under the threat of
punishment, is very interesting, and suggests exciting
hypotheses about psychopaths’ behavior and brain acti-
vations in our norm compliance task. Unlike Machiavel-
lian subjects, however, psychopaths lack the ability to
respond adaptively to punishment threats; they therefore
should show less compliance with the fairness norm
than healthy subjects, and this diminished norm compli-
ance should be associated with a lack of or a significantly
lower activation in the lateral OFC and the insula.
Our results also hint at a possible lateralization of the neu-
ral circuitry involved in social norm compliance, as we find
a strong positive correlation between the increase in norm
compliance under the threat of social punishment and brain
activation in the right, but not the left, DLPFC. The lateraliza-
tion hypothesis is consistent with a recent finding by Knochet al. (2006) that disruption of the right, but not the left,
DLPFC with low-frequency transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion is associated with more selfish and less fair-minded
behavior. These findings are also interesting in light of
evidence (Damasio, 1995) suggesting that patients with
right prefrontal lesions are characterized by the inability to
behave in normatively appropriate ways, despite the fact
that they are keenly aware of the prevailing norms such as
the fairness norm in tasks like ours (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004). Thus, a dysfunction of the right DLPFC or its specific
connections might also underlie certain psychopatho-
logical disorders characterized by excessively selfish
tendencies and a failure to obey basic social norms.
Finally, our finding that the DLPFC, VLPFC, and OLPFC
are part of the neural circuitry involved in social norm com-
pliance might have implications for the criminal justice
system. As these brain areas are not yet fully developed
in children, adolescents, or even young adults (Gogtay
et al., 2004), our results are consistent with the view that
these groups may be less able to activate the evaluative
and inhibitory neural circuitry necessary for the appropri-
ate processing of punishment threats. Thus, our results
might provide support for the view that the criminal justice
system (Garland and Glimcher, 2006; Sapolsky, 2004)
should treat children, adolescents, and immature adults
differently from adults.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Twenty-four healthy, right-handed male students (mean age ± SD,
23.5 ± 2.3 years) each participated as player A in the social fMRINeuron 56, 185–196, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 193
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Social Norm Complianceexperiment. One of the subjects obviously failed to understand the
game and was excluded from further analysis. We therefore refer to
a sample of 23 subjects throughout the manuscript.
In order to generate a credible punishment threat, the number of
MUs that could be spent on punishment and the effect of punishment
were calibrated in a previous behavioral pilot study. At the end of this
study, the subjects in the role of player B agreed that their decisions
could be reused in other sessions of the experiment. In the subsequent
fMRI study, each scanned player A faced the decisions of those in the
role of player B and hence faced decisions of real human opponents.
Both player A and B were paid real money. However, player B earned
money twice, once in the pilot experiment and once in the fMRI exper-
iment in which his decision had been reused.
In 24 trials of the game in the fMRI study, player A faced a player B
who could punish him (punishment condition) in half of the trials, while
player B was just a passive recipient of A’s transfer in the remaining
control trials. Prior to scanning, subjects read written instructions
describing the sequence of events, the treatment conditions, and the
payoff rules. Subjects received a lump sum payment ofV 20 for partici-
pating plus 1 eurocent for every MU earned. Only subjects with neither
an acute medical condition nor a history of psychiatric or neurological
illness could participate in the study. Subjects were scanned only after
contraindications had been excluded (through survey of subjects) and
subjects had given written informed consent. All methods and proce-
dures used in this study were approved by the human subjects com-
mittee of the University of Ulm, Germany, and conform to the Code
of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki).
fMRI Paradigm
Player A was randomly matched with another player B in each trial.
Player A saw, via fMRI-compatible video goggles mounted above
the subject’s eyes (Resonance Technology Inc., Northridge, CA), a
series of computer screens (Figure 1). In 24 rounds preceding the
game, subjects familiarized themselves with the response device,
a trackball-operated slider, by matching different predetermined
transfers. During the game, transfer decisions were made within 4.55
s (standard deviation 3.16 s) on average, and 96% of the decisions
were made within 10 s. Screens were presented, and behavioral and
timing data were collected using the software package zTREE (Fisch-
bacher, 2007), a program for conducting behavioral experiments in
combination with neuroimaging.
Prior to scanning of each experiment, subjects filled out several
questionnaires, including the Machiavelli questionnaire (Christie and
Geis, 1970), which consists of two subscales. One measures how
Machivellian a subject is, and the other measures how Machiavellian
a subject expects other people to be. Here we used the former sub-
scale to explore how a subject’s degree of Machivellism is related to
his brain activity and behavior.
fMRI Acquisition
BOLD gradient-echo-planar imaging was performed on a 3 Tesla
Siemens Magnetom Allegra (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). In accor-
dance with previous recommendations (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004;
Schmitz et al., 2005) we used an in-plane matrix resolution of 128 3
128 pixels (voxel size: 2 3 2 mm2) and a slice thickness of 2 mm
(+0.5 mm gap) when scanning 32 transversal slices with repetition
time (TR) 2490 ms, echo time 38 ms, and receiver bandwidth 2790
Hz/pixel in ascending direction. Slices were oriented steeper than
AC-PC orientation at an angle of 25 between transversal and coro-
nal planes. Anatomic imaging included a full-brain echo-planer image
(EPI) (parameters as above, 56 slices) and a sagittal MPRAGE T1
acquisition with voxel size 13 13 1 mm3 and matrix 2563 256 pixels.
fMRI Analysis
fMRI data underwent a standardized preprocessing (temporal and
spatial realignment, spatial normalization) and general linear model
(GLM) analysis with SPM5 (Release 748, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/194 Neuron 56, 185–196, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.spm). In each subject, the full-brain EPI was coregistered onto the
mean volume of the spatially realigned EPI time series. Then, the T1
image was coregistered onto the full-brain EPI and normalized to the
standard MNI T1 template. The resulting transformation procedure
was applied to the EPI time series, which was resliced to a voxel
size of 2 3 2 3 2 mm3. Finally, images were spatially smoothed with
a 10 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
In order to load signal variance onto all known sources of variance,
the GLM contained regressors for the treatment, decision, wait, and
informed epochs (see sequence of screens in Figure 1). All regressors
except the one for decision were modeled as epochs of 6 s length, with
onsets at the times of appearance of the respective screens (Figure 1).
Epoch length in the decision regressor was 5 s. Onset times were de-
termined by counting back 5 s from the point in time when the subject
had sent his decision, thereby reducing the length of a treatment ep-
och in case the subject made the subsequent decision within less
than 5 s. All regressors came in two main conditions, punishment
and control, leading to eight regressors per subject. All regressors
were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function.
Linear contrasts between decision in trials with punishment versus de-
cision in trials without punishment were subjected to a random effects
analysis to compute main effects (one-sample t test), and to regression
analyses with behavioral and questionnaire data as regressors.
Anatomic labeling of activated regions was done by two observers
(M.S. and G.G.) with experience in neuroanatomy, both visually by
using an anatomic atlas (Duvernoy, 1999) and computationally with
the WFU PickAtlas (V1.02, Wake Forest University School of Medicine)
and MRIcro (V1.39, Build 4, http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/).
Supplemental Data
The Supplemental Data for this article can be found online at http://
www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/56/1/185/DC1/.
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